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Abstract. Delivery of products bought online can violate consumers’ privacy,
although not in a straightforward way. In particular, delivery companies that have
contracted with a website know the company selling the product, as well as the
name and address of the online customer. To make matters worse, if the same
delivery company has contracted with many websites, aggregated information per
address may be used to profile customers’ transaction activities. In this paper, we
present a fair delivery service system with guaranteed customer anonymity and
merchant-customer unlinkability, with reasonable assumptions about the threat
model.
1 Introduction
A lot of work has been done over the last 25–30 years on privacy for networking
and paying for products. Here, we address privacy concerns from the delivery
of products to the buyers. Delivery of purchases made online is usually per-
formed by a courier company who has contracted with the website selling the
product (merchant). Based on the current product delivery infrastructure and a
plausible threat model, we propose a privacy-preserving product system.
Privacy Concerns. Product delivery raises many privacy concerns, primarily
deriving from information the delivery company acquires from the merchant.
As noted, the delivery company is usually under contract to the seller. Given the
(usually) long-term monetary relationship between the two, the delivery com-
pany knows the following: (a) the type of products the merchants sell; (b) the
name and shipping address of the person the product is for. This person may or
may not be the one who bought the product; (c) the exact object shipped, if it is
fragile or of great value.
Certainly, the courier company knows the person to whom the product is
delivered, as well as the type of the product. In addition, since the same delivery
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company may serve a variety of other websites, the former may obtain a very
good approximation of the transaction profile of consumers who often make
purchases online.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we will introduce a privacy-preserving de-
livery system based on package-routing through multiple courier companies,
where,
– the courier company knows at most the merchant or the type of the product
shipped, but not the recipient.
– there is no way for the merchant to recover the address of the intended re-
cipient without collaborating with more than one courier company.
We emphasize on the fact that our system is deployable. Our threat model is
based on the powers of any current real-world delivery system entities. For the
purposes of our protocols, we made use of blind ([C81], [CL02], [O06]) and
group ([CS97]) signatures as well as of blind group signature schemes ([LR98]).
Organization. In the following section we provide a brief overview of our sys-
tem entities and requirements with a particular focus on privacy definition and
threat model. Sections 3 and 4 present in detail our delivery protocol and discuss
many deployability and security issues related to it.
2 System Architecture
As in all currently-deployed e-commerce systems, the most important entities
are:
– Merchants, who are the entities who maintain a website selling a particular
product or series of products. A broader definition of merchants may include
websites like Amazon or EBay, where a large variety of products is sold.
– Customers, who buy one more products from merchants.
– Delivery Companies (DCs), which are the courier companies paid by a
merchant to deliver the product to an address specified by the customer.
Delivery companies maintain a number of mail stations (MSs) on their own,
while (if necessary) making use of the mail stations of other DCs. Although
affiliated with DCs, in the following sections MSs will constitute separate
entities.
For anonymity purposes, we extend the current delivery system with a central
Anonymous Physical Object Delivery Administration (APODA), which is
the manager of our Anonymous Physical Object Delivery (APOD) system. It
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authorizes the DCs and their mail stations to participate in the APOD, maintains
the APOD website, etc. Merchants who need to send something anonymously
may do it through any of the DCs which have contracted with APOD. As we
will show in a later section, a part of the DC’s payment goes to the APODA,
who then distributes the payments among the rest of the nodes in the system
according to the services they provided.
2.1 System Requirements
Privacy is the main focus in our system and defining it is critical. According to
a general privacy definition [SS07], Privacy is the right of an entity (normally
a person), acting on its own behalf, to determine the degree to which it will
interact with its environment, including the degree to which the entity is willing
to share information about itself with others. In the context of product delivery
service (and assuming that no identity is revealed through the online payment
procedure), privacy requires that the merchant should not be able to learn his
customer’s address, unless authorized by the latter. In addition, the DC should
not be able to link any particular package destination address to the merchant
who authorized the package’s shipment.
Other requirements of our system, which basically derive from the nature of
the system we want to enhance, are the following:
– Package Delivery to Intended Recipients.We require that the package shipped
is delivered to the legal recipient of the package.
– Package Tracing. We require that a customer who has requested anonymous
delivery of her online purchases is able to trace her packages without any
information related to her or the item shipped being leaked. In addition, we
require that merchant is able to trace the status of the delivery of the product,
without acquiring any information regarding the intended package recipient.
Tracing the package from both merchant and customer is especially impor-
tant when the package has not been delivered within the estimated time.
– Fairness. Delivery Companies and mail stations involved are only paid when
they perform their service correctly.
– Proof of Delivery/Accountability. We require that there can exist an undeni-
able proof of receipt issued by the anonymous recipient when she receives
the package. Although unforgeable, this “receipt” should carry no identifica-
tion or location-related information. In addition, in case of delivery failure,
there should be possible to trace the misbehaving party.
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2.2 Adversarial Model
Our goal is to create a realizable system. Thus, we require that our entities have
the abilities and powers of the corresponding entities in real systems.
Each Merchant is interested in maintaining his clientele, which implies that
he is trusted to perform his functional operations correctly. However, we assume
that he is “curious”, namely he may try to combine information he possesses to
reveal his customers’ identities. A merchant may also collaborate with the DC
he has paid to learn the recipient’s address.
We make similar assumptions regarding Delivery Companies’ powers . In
particular, although “honest” in their functional operations, it is likely that a DC
would collaborate with a merchant it has contracted with to reveal the recipient
of a particular package1. The reason for the latter assumption is the following:
the DC’s primary concern is to maximize its profit and thus to get paid for the
services it has provided. Because of this strong monetary DC-dependence on the
merchant, DCs are motivated — if requested — to provide the latter with all the
recipient-related information its mail stations possess. Collusion between two
DCs, however, is considered to be highly unlikely.
Anonymous Physical Object Delivery System(APOD) consists of several
independent or semi-dependent mail stations (MSs) which are associated with
one of the DCs as well as affiliated with an administration authority (APODA).
We generally assume that MSs are independent if they belong to a different DC,
while there is a chance of sharing the information they possess when they are
part of the same company. More specifically, each MS: (a) possesses its own
secret authorization/identification information (digital and group membership
signature keys), (b) forwards mail towards their destination by contacting at
most the MS the package came from and the MS the mail is forwarded to, and,
(c) may provide the information it possesses to the central authority of the same
DC.
As mentioned before, for practical purposes we include in the design of
the DC system an central administration station APODA, which handles pay-
ment and authorization matters. As such, it provides a valid MS with certificates
(keys etc.). In our threat model, only the payment section of APODA is online
and obtains no further information regarding the system unless compelled by a
privileged authority such as a judge.
1 It is easy to see how this model is applied in real world if we consider the fact the employees
in a DC may not trick any client directly, since they will lose their job, while they may try to
combine information the company has obtained legally to draw their own conclusions.
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2.3 Payments for Anonymous Routing vs. Anonymous Product Delivery
Our anonymous delivery system has many similarities with PAR [ARS+08], a
payment system specially designed for the Tor anonymity network [DMS04]. In
particular, APODand PAR are similar in terms of threat models and goals.
1. (Goals) In both cases the goal is accountable and fair packet/package de-
livery through a group of nodes/MSs with guaranteed sender/merchant -
receiver/recipient unlinkability. Another similar goal is the user-anonymity
w.r.t. the other communication party: PAR (Tor) requires sender anonymity
w.r.t. the receiver, while in APOD we require recipient anonymity w.r.t. the
merchant.
2. (Adversarial Model) In both cases we deal with a local adversary, i.e. an
adversary that may not control all the nodes/MSs in a user-chosen2 delivery
path. As in PAR (Tor), path nodes can only observe the traffic of their path
neighbors and collaborate with other nodes which may or may not be part of
the same path. Similarly, in our APOD MSs may observe the package-flow
from/to their path neighbors and collaborate only with mail stations of the
same DC which may or may not be part of the path of a particular package.
For APOD, we explicitly rule out “active attacks” such as attaching a GPS-
based tracking device to the packages.
3 Privacy Preserving Delivery Systems
In what follows, we will assume that each customer has completed her trans-
actions with the merchants anonymously, i.e., no identification information has
leaked through product browsing or payment procedure.
As mentioned before, APOD is coordinated by an offline administration au-
thority, the APODA. Delivery companies (DCs) which participate in the APOD
obtain membership credentials from the APODA. In a similar way, APODA is-
sues authorization credentials to the mail stations (MSs) that offer their services
to the APOD. Therefore, the APODA is the coordinator of two groups: (a) the
DC group (APODA-DC) and (b) the MS group (APODA-MS) of the participat-
ing DCs and MSs respectively. We need to emphasize that, although DC group
members may own some or all of the MSs in the APODA-MS group, no package
may be provided anonymous delivery unless authorized by a DC group member.
Each Merchant is in agreement with one or more DCs. In particular, each
merchant is a member of the Mgroup (DC-M) of one or more DCs.
The customer chooses one among the DCs that have contracted with the
merchant and are part of the APODA-DC group. Then, the merchant uses his
2 User for PAR (Tor) is the sender, while for the APOD user is the recipient.
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DC membership credentials to issue a blind ticket T to the customer. The cus-
tomer uses T to log in to APOD’s website anonymously and to choose the MSs
she wants her package to go through. She then collaborates with the APODA to
issue one blind package-coin (pcoin) per MS in the path with serial numbers of
her choice. Serial numbers in this case serve as package tracking numbers. The
client uses the information contained in the website to encrypt triplets of
(package-coin, tracing-info, next-destination)
with each path station’s public key. She then interacts with the merchant to get
a proof-receipt of the final form of the label which the latter will attach to the
product.
Within the delivery process, each path MS decrypts the part of the package-
label corresponding to it, revealing the package coins (pcoins) as well as the MS
to forward the package to. In addition, each MS uploads the tracing information
to the APODA site, so that both the merchant and the client are informed of the
package delivery status. We note that no piece of label-information provided to
each path MS carries merchant/client identification information.
To assure that only the intended recipient of the product may receive the
package, the customer and the merchant agree on a secret PIN number whose
endorsed hash is added to the overall packet label. The endorsement is basically
created by the DC in collaboration with the merchant in a way that it reveals no
information regarding which exactly DC of the APODA-DC group has produced
it.
To enforce that each station forwards the packet towards the right direction,
package-coins (pcoins) are accompanied by receipts which MSs will only get
from the next path station after the latter receives the package. As pcoins with
their receipts will later be used for the distribution of payments among the path
MSs, there is a strong motivation for MSs to do their job properly.
3.1 Building Blocks
In this section, we describe the definition and security of the group, blind, and
blind group signatures. See [CL02], [JLO97], [KY05] and [LR98] respectively.
Group Signature Schemes (GSS). In a typical GSS, there is a group man-
ager (GM), the group-members, who act as signers (let each be S) and produce
signatures on behalf of the group. The procedures supported are the following:
• (gpk, gsk) ← GS.Setup(1k). This algorithm generates a group public key
gpk and the GM’s secret group information gsk .
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• 〈uskS, JLogS〉 ← GS.Join(gpk)[S,GM(gsk)]. When this interactive join pro-
cedure ends, an S obtains a secret signing key uskS, and the GM (group man-
ager) logs the join transcript in the database D.
• σ ← GS.Sign(gpk, uskS,m). This algorithm generates a group signature on
a message m.
• 〈>/⊥〉 ← GS.Verify(gpk,m, σ). This is a verification algorithm.
• MS ← GS.Open(gsk, σ,D). With this algorithm the GM determines the
identity of the group member who generated the signature σ.
Security Properties: (a) Anonymity. Given a signature and two members, one
of whom is the originator, the adversary can identify its originator among the
group members no better than randomly. (b) Unforgeability. The adversary can-
not produce a valid group signature without owning group membership infor-
mation. (c)Non-framability. The adversary cannot create a valid group signature
that opens to another group member.
Blind Signature Scheme (BSS). In a typical BSS, there are signers (let each
be S) who produce blind signatures on messages of users (let each be U). The
procedures supported are the following:
• (pkS, skS) ← BS.KeyGen(1k). This is a key-generation algorithm that out-
puts a public/secret key-pair (pkS, skS).
• 〈>/⊥, σ/⊥〉 ← BS.Sign(pkS)[S(skS), C(m)]. At the end of this interactive
procedure, the output of the S is either completed or not-completed and the
output of U is either the signature (σ) or a failure sign (⊥).
• 〈>/⊥〉 ← BS.Verify(m,σ, pkS) is a verification algorithm.
Security Properties: Apart from Unforgeability, Blindness is the most important
security property of blind signature schemes: S does not learn any information
about the message m on which it generates a signature σ.
We make use of GSS to instantiate theAPODA-MS group, where theAPODA
is the group manager and the MSs who participate in the APOD are the group
members.
Blind Group Signature Scheme (BGS). In a typical group signature scheme
we can identify the group manager(GM), who maintains the BGS group ad-
ministration information, the group-members who produce group signatures on
users’ messages. For now we will assume that a user U, has requested group
member S to produce a signature on message m. The procedures supported are
the following:
• (bgpk, bgsk) ← BGS.Setup(1k). This algorithm generates a group public
key bgpk and the GM’s secret administration information bgsk .
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• 〈uskS, bcertS,BJLogS〉 ← BGS.Join(bgpk)[S,GM(bgsk)]. When this inter-
active join procedure ends, S obtains her secret signing key uskS, her mem-
bership certificate bcertS, and the GM logs the join transcript in the database
D.
• σ ← BGS.Sign(bgpk)[S(uskS),U(m)], where U obtains a signature on m.
• 〈>/⊥〉 ← BGS.Verify(bgpk,m, σ). This is a verification algorithm run by a
verifier.
• S ← BGS.Open(bgsk, σ,D). This algorithm is run only by GM and deter-
mines the identity of the S which generated the signature σ.
Security Properties: They combine the properties of group and blind signature
schemes: Anonymity, Unforgeability, Non-framability, Undeniable Signer Iden-
tity towards the group manager, Signatures’ Unlinkability and Blindness.
We make use of BGS in two cases: to instantiate the APODA-DC group
— where APODA is the GM and the DCs participating in APOD are the group
members — and to instantiate the M-group — where a DC is the GM and the
merchants-clients of that DC are the group members.
Notation: We will use BSigy (BSig
x
y) for blind (group x) signatures and Sigy
(Sigxy) for regular (group x) digital signatures of y.
3.2 Protocol Description
Anonymous Delivery System’s Administration (APODA) makes the required
setup (if any) for the two groups it manages (see subsection 3.1 for prelimi-
naries):
• the APODA-DC group, which is instantiated through a blind group signature
scheme and
• the APODA-MS group, which is realized through a plain group signature
scheme.
Therefore, the APODA executes BGS.Setup and GS.Setup to obtain:
(bgpkAPODA−DC, bgskAPODA−DC) and (gpkAPODA−MS, gskAPODA−MS).
In addition, for payment purposes, APODA executes BS.KeyGen to generate a
blind signature key pair (pkAPODA, skAPODA) and defines two hashes: a pcoin(Hpcoin)
and a PIN (HPIN) - related. The APODA publishes her public keys and the
hashes:
bgpkAPODA−DC, gpkAPODA−MS, pkAPODA, Hpcoin and HPIN.
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Delivery Companies (DCs) acquire membership in the group of companies par-
ticipating in the APOD. More specifically, each delivery company DCi collabo-
rates with the APODA in a BGS.Join procedure to issue a blind group signature




To manage all of its participating merchants, DCi groups them together in a
blind group signature group (see subsection 3.1), the DCi −M. Therefore, DCi
performs the appropriate setup (BGS.Setup) to generate the corresponding blind
group signature administration information:
bgpkDCi −M, bgskDCi −M. DCi publishes bgpkDCi −M.
Mail stations (MSs) acquire membership in the APODA-MS group by interact-




which enables each MS MSi to sign a quantity on behalf of the APODA-MS
group in an indistinguishable way. Each MSi also runs EC.UKeyGen procedure




Each MerchantMj is a member of the group of clients (M-group) of one or more
DCs he has contracted with. Let DCi be one of these DCs. To obtain member-
ship, Mj collaborates with the DCi’s central authority in BGS.Join protocol to




runs EC.UKeyGen protocol to create a public encryption key pair (pkeM, sk
e
M).
Customer C has preestablished a pseudonymous account with the merchant,
which we assume carries no C-identification information (PC, secretPC). Al-
though out of the scope of this paper, we may consider PC as a pseudonym such
as the ones introduced in [LRSW99].
In what follows we will assume that a customer C collaborates anonymously
with a merchant Mj , while Mj has contracted with the Delivery Company DCi.
Package Label Preparation Procedure. There are four main phases in prepar-
ing the label which will be attached to each package sent anonymously: merchant-
client interaction, DC-client interaction, APOD-client interaction and merchant
client interaction:
Merchant-Client Interaction. Mj and C agree on a number PIN , which will
serve as an authentication code between the two. Mj hashes the PIN into
PINh = HPIN(PIN||date)
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in order to use it later as part of the barcode on top of the product. Final MS will
only hand out the package to a person who demonstrates knowledge of PIN .
Finally, Mj interacts with C — through PC — such that the latter obtains a blind
credential from Mj , credb. credb is a blind signature of Mj on a random number





where DCi −M denotes the M-group of DCi. Mj does not know the final form
of credb. However, anyone can confirm credb’s validity as having derived by a
valid DCi’s customer.
Client-Delivery Company Interaction.C uses credb to enterDCi’s website anony-
mously. DCi’s M-group administrator evaluates credb (BGS.Verify) and updates
the statistics regarding merchant Mj . Here we need to note that according to the
group signature attributes (see 3.1) DCi, as the M-group administrator is the
only entity, who using BGS.Open procedure, can identify the merchant who
produced a DCi −M group signature. C — through her credb — collaborates





where APODA − DC denotes the DC group of APODA. In addition, C estab-
lishes a one time use anonymous account with DCi to enter APOD’s website
AC = (BSigAPODA−DCDCi (NA), NA).
Client-APODA Interaction. Customer C logs in to APOD’s website using AC.
TheAPODA verifiesAC’s validity (BGS.Verify), updatesDCi’s statistics (BGS.Open)
and allows C to browse in APOD’s website to choose the route of her package.
For each intermediate stop of the path she chooses, C:
1. collaborates with APOD to issue:
(pc1, r1), (pc2, r2), . . . , (pcm, rm),
where pck = BSigAPODA(Hpcoin(rk)), k = 1 . . .m are the receipt enabled
package-coins (pcoins). Receipt parts (rk) are chosen by C and their hashes
will serve as packet tracking numbers.
2. creates merchant-related package tracing parts: mt1,mt2, . . . ,mtm, where
mtk = EncMj (K)||EncK{1||SigPC(Nk)}, i = 1, . . . ,m.
Namely mtk are pseudonym-signed random numbers(Nk), encrypted under
Mj’s public key. ”1” is used for merchant to realize whether an uploaded
tracing number is referring to him.
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3. combines the pcoins, their receipts and merchant package-tracing parts in
groups of
Msgk = {pcoin(stopk), receipt(stopk−1),mt(stopk), stopk+1}
where
receipt(stopk−1) = Encpkestopk−1 (K)||EncK(rk−1)
is encrypted with (k-1)-stop’s public key. The Msg for the last stop f ,
contains, additionally, pcoin(stopf )’s receipt in a PIN -encrypted form:
EncPIN(receipt(stopf )). All Msg-s are encrypted with the public encryp-
tion keys each MS acquires from APOD’s administration authority into
barcodestopk = Encpkestopk (Msgk).
Merchant-Client Interaction. C, as PC, sends all barcodes and σPINh to the mer-
chant Mj . Mj hashes and digitally signs (S.Sign) the entire barcode sequence
into
σbarcodes = SigMj (Hproof(barcodes, σPINh))
and sends it to C (PC) as a proof of what the former attaches to the packet to
be sent out. C verifies the σbarcodes’s validity and sends a verification response
email with a notification of the first mail stop of the path: SigPC
(stop1, date).
Shipment. Merchant Mj prints out stickers for each of the barcodes as well as
for the σPIN, which he attaches to the package to be sent anonymously. He then
delivers the package to the first station of the path. For label integrity purposes,
both parties, Mj and stop1, exchange signed hashes of the encrypted route of
the packet sent out:




While the package moves from one MS to the other, each MS decrypts
the barcode which corresponds to it. In this way, the next package destination
is revealed along with the pcoin. Pcoins(pck-s) contained in each barcode are
checked for validity (BS.Verify), while their serial is uploaded in the database
of the APOD along with the merchant tracing parts (mt-s). In this way, C may
track her package delivery status (by checking whether each serial number has
been uploaded and thus reached its destination). At the same time, receipt parts
of each barcode are sent back to the path predecessors of each station as a proof
that the package was properly delivered. Merchant tracing parts (mt-s) are up-
loaded on APOD’s website; Mj may then attempt to decrypt them using his
secret decryption key. We note that Mj can only see the tracing numbers up-
loaded on the APOD website and not the particular MSs who uploaded them.
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To avoid any path recovery attacks based on the time each mt-s are uploaded,
path MSs may randomize the time interval between the package arrival time and
the corresponding mt-upload.
When the package reaches the final stop — where C picks her package up
the last pcoin serial is uploaded. To obtain the package, C should provide the
PIN agreed upon with the merchant. Non invertibility property of hash functions
guarantees that only C is able to provide that number. A value different from
HPIN and a pre-agreed hash of the PIN (HPIN received) is then signed with MS’s
MS group signature uploaded to APOD’s website:
RecDel = SigAPODA−MSMSk (HPIN received(PIN)).
Mj records RecDel as proof that the package was properly delivered. At the same
time, PIN reveals the receipt for the pcoin provided in the last stop. If no one
comes to pick the package up within 10 days of its arrival at the last stop, the
latter returns the packet to the MS it received it from.
Payment. The merchant charges the customer for the anonymous delivery ser-
vice. The price may include the services of the upper bound of number of
MSs that can be included in the anonymous path. DCi charges the merchant
in proportion to the merchant-signed endorsements the former receives from
customers in the client-DCi interaction phase. In a similar vein, the APODA
charges the DCi at each valid client-APODA interaction. The aggregated pay-
ments the APODA receives are distributed among the different MSs in propor-
tion to the valid pcoins and receipts they present to the APODA.
4 System Considerations
In this section we will provide a brief presentation of how our requirements are
satisfied.
Privacy. Privacy in our system consists of two parts: (a) Recipient Anonymity
against the merchant and the delivery companies the latter has contracted with,
and (b) Sender-Recipient Unlinkability against any delivery company or the
APODA.
During the label preparation procedure, Recipient Anonymity is preserved
through the combination of the anonymity provided by PC and the unlinkabil-
ity property guaranteed by the Blindness property of blind (group) signatures.
In particular, a customer C uses her PC pseudonym to browse the merchant’s
website, an (unlinkable to PC) anonymous account credb to browse to the DC’s
website and an (unlinkable to credb) account AC to visit APODA’s website.
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The information each entity possesses at the stage of the label preparation is the
following:
– the merchant M knows PC, the product PC wants to have anonymously de-
livered, and that he provided PC a blind credb.
– the delivery company DCi (as the manager of its M-group) knows that credb
has interacted with M and that it provided credb with a blind AC.
– the APODA knows that that AC has interacted with DCi and the MSs AC
has requested info for, which may finally be added to the delivery path or
not. However, APODA has no information regarding M.
It is obvious that there is no recipient (customer) identification information
known to any of the entities participating in the label preparation procedure.
Sender-Recipient Unlinkability is also satisfied at this stage. Since timing is not
an issue here, the merchant can not be linked to a particular AC.
Customer Anonymity is preserved throughout the package delivery proce-
dure. No C-identification information is contained in the label attached to the
product. For the delivery of the product at the final stop, C only needs to demon-
strate knowledge of PIN .
As far as the Sender-Recipient Unlinkability requirement is concerned, the
information attached to the package, (σPIN||barcode1|| . . . ||barcodem), has been
created by the customer and cannot be linked to any of credb/AC accounts the
latter used to create the label. However, each MS in the path knows both the ex-
act form of the label attached to the package and its delivery path neighbors. In
our threat model, MSs from the same DC may collaborate by comparing pack-
age labels, so they recover a package’s path. Although we consider this case
highly unlikely as it is not cost effective, the severity of this attack is consider-
ably decreased by the following:
– Mj may attach the barcodes in any order. Although this would require extra
computation power in each stop, as each MS will have to go through the
entire label to detect the barcode which refers to it, no MS — except for the
first and the last — will be able to find its place in the path.
– C is the one choosing the entire path. She can easily choose the first and
final stops3 to be from different DCs.
Even in cases where the aforementioned scenario cannot be avoided, the most
a DC may learn is the location of the final stop of a particular package without
knowing the corresponding it to particular merchant or recipient. For complete-
ness, we will refer to different types of collaborations between entities in our
3 We refer to the stops of these path positions, since they would link the sender (merchant) to a
particular recipient (location wise).
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system. Although collaborations involving APODA or more than one DCs are
not included in our threat model — since there is no direct monetary depen-
dence between the merchant and APODA or other DCs — we refer to them as
they may occur in the extreme case where a Judge has requested information
about the recipient of a particular package.
a. M-DCi (or DCi-APODA): Because of credb (AC) blindness, M-DCi (DCi-
APODA) collaboration will reveal nothing more than whatDCi (APODA) knows.
b. any M-APODA collaboration: The APODA knows the MS – (mt-s/RecDel)
uploads correspondence, while M knows the (mt-s/RecDel) – PC correspon-
dence. Thus M-APODA collusion may lead to complete package path recovery.
Depending on the privacy level we need to enforce, one way to avoid this
attack scenario is via authorized-anonymous MS-logins(uploads) to APODA’s
website, using unlinkable-blind credentials ( [SSG97]). Payments can be made
through another type of blind coins, issued in response to each valid pcoin-
receipt upload; these may be deposited unlinkably by MSs in person. Delivery
proofs Recdels may have the form of
Recdel = BSigAPODA(HPIN received(PIN)),
where the signature is produced blindly by the MS-APODA collaboration and
uploaded anonymously by the final path MS. In this way, M-APODA attempts
at package path recovery will fail.
Package Delivery to Intended Recipients. It is satisfied through the non-invertibility
attribute of hash functions. In this way, only the legal recipient of the package,
i.e., the one who interacted with the merchant, is able to demonstrate knowledge
of PIN . To avoid any attack on any party’s behalf to link a package to a partic-
ular Recdel upload, the final path MS uploads a pre-agreed hash of the PIN as
opposed to the PIN itself.
Package Tracing. Package tracing is satisfied through the uploads of the pcoins’
serials and the mt-s to the APOD’s website. A merchant may visit that site any-
time to collect themt-s which refer to him. The customer may trace her package
delivery status by checking on the serial numbers uploaded.
Fairness-Accountability. Fairness is satisfied in our system since, if a MS does
not forward the package towards the right direction, it will never receive his
pcoin receipt and will thus not be paid. pcoin receipts serve accountability as
well, as they provide a proof of proper delivery of the package to the next path
MS. Invalid pcoin-receipt pairs may be resolved through APODA, which will
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request the cooperation of all nodes to recover the full path corresponding to a
package label and, thus, the misbehaving MS.
We note that we assume a customer does not deliberately provide invalid
pcoin-receipt pairs, as it would only affect the payment distribution within the
MSs, while she — having already paid the merchant — will have no monetary
motive. On the other hand, the PIN requirement for the final package delivery
guarantees that no customer can falsily claim failure of the delivery process.
5 Related Work
As mail service is not a new concept, anonymous package delivery has been
addressed in the past by several companies.
iPrivacy [S01] guarantees anonymous ecommerce activity, including anony-
mous delivery service. However, in iPrivacy the delivery company already knows
the address of the recipient. The consumer provides the merchant with a special
code number which corresponds to his address in iPrivacy’s databases. iPrivacy
then uses extra physical boxes, each with different address for the package to
be sent to different locations prior to its final destination. Recipient anonymity
in this case is physically vulnerable, while the iPrivacy company may link a
merchant to a particular address.
ContinentalRelay [CON07] is another company guarranteing anonymous
package delivery. However, in this case anonymity is guarranteed from the mer-
chant (sender) but not from the delivery company itself: customers pay a monthly
fee to maintain a fake Australian address. Every package sent to this imaginary
mailbox is then forwarded to the customer’s real address. However, this solution
may be more expensive and inconvenient, as some mail carrier services will not
deliver to a mailbox.
Kushik Chatterjee in [C08] has also suggested a patent for efficient anony-
mous package delivery service. In particular, Chatterjee suggested a system
where the physical address of the recipient is identified within the delivery sys-
tem with an identification number, which is what sender attaches to the mail
sent. Thus recipient’s physical address is concealed from the sender but not
from the delivery company.
Tor[DMS04] and other onion routing protocols[SGR97] as well as PAR[ARS+08]
can also be considered as part of the related work in this paper as described in
section2.3.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a real-world applicable delivery service protocol for
online purchases with guaranteed merchant-customer unlinkability and recipi-
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ent anonymity w.r.t. the merchant and/or the delivery companies involved. Our
protocols utilise similar techniques to the Tor[DMS04] anonymity network and
support package tracing and mail delivery proof. As opposed to currently de-
ployed anonymous delivery techniques, recipient’s address is concealed even
from the company paid to perform the delivery.
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